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By: David Allen Larson*
The United States Supreme Court recently allowed Trans World Airlines,
Inc. (TWA) to make a promise to striking employees that significantly
affects unions' ability to engage in collective action. In Trans World Airlines
Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants,' a case arising under
the Railway Labor Act (RLA),2 TWA was permitted to encourage junior
strikers to immediately return to work by promising them that they would
not be displaced at the end of the strike by more senior full-time strikers.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that this would result in a loss
of seniority for the full-time strikers because those strikers retain seniority
for purposes of future reductions of force, future vacancies in desirable
assignments, and job scheduling. Although these continuing benefits of
seniority will not be realized until full-time strikers are actually reinstated,
the court justified its decision by explaining that the RLA provides broader
avenues for self-help than the National Labor Relations Act.3 The Court
determined that TWA's action was lawful because, after the parties exhaust
resolution procedures under the RLA, they may use any peaceful, self-
help measure that does not strike a fundamental blow to union or employee
activity or the collective bargaining process itself.4 By allowing an employer
to guarantee returning junior employees protection from displacement,
however, the Supreme Court is doing nothing less than permitting employers
to deliver a fundamental blow to union activity.
* Associate Professor, Creighton University School of Law. J.D., University
of Illinois College of Law; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania Law School. This
article was partially funded by the Creighton Law School Faculty Research Fund.
1. 109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. 1987). The Court thus distinguished
this case from those arising under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The
RLA regulates the railroad and airline industries and the NLRA covers most other
private employers.
4. TWA, 109 S. Ct. at 1235.
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The prospect of collective action in a nation like the United States,
which cultivates individual independence and autonomy rather than inter-
dependence throughout the society, presents an intriguing paradox. In an
era in which the emphasis continues to gravitate toward individual rights
in the workplace, courts must not overlook the inherent fragility of the
collective voice. Not only is the result in this case unfair to the more
senior employees, more importantly, it ignores the fact that unions can
only survive when the collective voice is strong. This result weakens the
collective voice and, thus, strikes a blow against union activity and the
collective bargaining process. It sanctions offers to junior employees that
encourage them to ignore collective concerns and instead rush back to
work, responding to what appears to be in their individual best interest.
The problem is, of course, that what may appear to be in an employee's
best short-term interest may actually be contrary to his or her long-term
interests.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In March of 1984, TWA and the Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants (IFFA) began negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement
to replace the agreement scheduled to expire in July. The existing agreement
created a complex bidding system which ensured that the most senior
employees would have the best opportunity to obtain preferred job as-
signments, flight schedules, the most desirable bases of operation as va-
cancies occur, and the greatest protection from periodic furloughs. Although
the parties bargained unsuccessfully for two years over wages and working
conditions, the seniority bidding system was not a focus of the dispute.
After pursuing the dispute resolution systems required under the RLA
(negotiation, mediation, and the final thirty day cooling-off period) the
union went out on strike.'
TWA advised the flight attendants that it would continue operations
by hiring permanent replacements, using those attendants who did not
strike, and rehiring any strikers who abandoned the strike and offered to
return to available vacancies. TWA stated that it would fill any vacancies
created by the strike according to the seniority bidding system. Furthermore,
these assignments would remain effective after the strike. 6 This promise
gave senior flight attendants an incentive to remain at or return to work
in order to retain prior job and domicile assignments. It also gave junior
flight attendants an incentive to remain at or return to work to acquire
job and domicile assignments previously occupied by more senior strikers.
After 72 days, the union made an unconditional offer to return to
work on behalf of approximately 5,000 remaining strikers. TWA accepted
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the offer, but initially recalled only 197 of the most senior employees,
refusing to displace those employees who had abandoned the strike and
returned to work before the union's offer. In an effort to displace the
newly hired employees, as well as less senior crossover employees, the union
filed suit. It unsuccessfully argued that the full-term strikers were not
economic strikers but rather were unfair labor practice strikers and, thus,
entitled to reinstatement. The union also argued that, even if the strike
was economic, the full term strikers were entitled to reinstatement under
either the terms of the prestrike collective bargaining agreement or under
the RLA.7 The District Court held that the full-term strikers could not
displace either the junior crossovers or the 1,220 new attendants employed
immediately after the strike.8 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed in part and held that more senior full-time employees could displace
junior crossovers. In reaching its decision, the court relied on its reading
of the union security clause as well as judicial interpretations of the National
Labor Relations Act.9
THE Sum m CoURT
The Supreme Court, by a six to three margin, rejected the Eighth
Circuit's conclusion that senior strikers can displace junior crossovers.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor looked to cases decided under
the NLRA for guidance in determining the rights of returning strikers. She
found that in the 1938 case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,1°
the Court held that under section 8 of the NLRA it was not an unfair
labor practice to refuse to displace strike replacements to make room for
returning strikers. The union argued that NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,"
which denied employers the right to offer twenty years "superseniority"
to crossovers, provided a basis for distinguishing junior crossovers from
new hires. Justice O'Connor responded by pointing out that an offer similar
to the one in Erie Resistor would continue to affect every subsequent lay-
off and, thus, continually remind all employees of the dangers of union
activities. In contrast, the returning flight attendants in TWA could use
their full seniority to displace junior crossovers during lay-offs and to
outbid junior crossovers for job vacancies and job scheduling. Justice
O'Conner explained that, consequently, TWA's offer did not have the
same continuing impact.
7. Id. at 1229.
8. A separate issue was whether the 463 new hires not fully trained by the
end of the strike could be replaced. Both the District Court and Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit agreed that these new hires could be replaced.
9. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
819 F.2d 839, 843-45 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989).
10. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
11. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
1989]
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The union maintained that this policy would have lasting effects because
it creates competition among strikers to acquire the most desirable assign-
ments. It results in resentful divisions between returning strikers and junior
crossovers. Additionally, the competition would undermine the union's
ability to take collective action.'2
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected what it saw as an attempt
to expand Erie Resistor. It stated that both the RLA and NLRA protect
an employee's right not to strike. 3 Furthermore, an employer's right to
hire permanent replacements sets up the same kind of competition that
TWA's policy creates. This right similarly creates divisions between those
employees who remain on strike and those who return for fear of losing
their job to a new hire. 4 The court dismissed the impact of TWA's conduct
by asserting, "[A]ll that has occurred is that the employer has filled vacancies
created by striking employees."' 5 The majority could see no reason why
those employees who chose not to gamble on the success of the strike
should suffer the consequences.
The union then argued that regardless of whether the NLRA outlawed
a crossover policy, section 2 (Fourth) of the RLA 6 prohibits this crossover
offer. Its contention was that this policy was an attempt to influence or
coerce flight attendants to drop membership in the IFFA.17 Disagreeing
with the union's argument, the Court explained that section 2 (Fourth)
does not apply in this instance. Courts always have interpreted that section
as primarily addressing precertification rights and freedoms of unorganized
employees. 8 The effectiveness of the detailed procedural framework of the
RLA depends upon the assurance that neither party will be able to enlist
the Court to further partisan goals. The Court concluded that it should




16. Section 152 (Fourth) reads in part:
Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class
of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the repre-
sentative of the craft or class for purposes of this chapter. No carrier,
its officers, or agents shall deny or in any way question the right of its
employees to join, or organize, or assist in organizing the labor organization
of their choice, and it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in
any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of
the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor or-
ganization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining,
or in performing any work therefor or to influence or to coerce employees
in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain
members of any labor organization ....
45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth) (1982).
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"hesitate to imply limitations on all but those forms of self-help that strike
a fundamental blow to union or employer activity and the collective bar-
gaining process itself."1 9
THE DISSIENTS
Justices Brennan and Blackmun wrote separate dissents, with Justice
Marshall joining Justice Brennan. Justice Brennan began by declaring that
a policy of discriminating against full-term strikers by giving preference to
junior crossovers is inherently destructive of the right to strike. 20 In support
of his position, he cited Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,21
a case which examined the extent of a state court's power to issue an
anti-strike injunction. In Railroad Trainmen, the Supreme Court stated that
Congress designed section 2 (Fourth) primarily, if not exclusively, to prohibit
coercive employer practices. Justice Brennan then observed that whatever
may have been the primary purpose of this section, it is too late in the
day to suggest it does not prohibit coercion of the right to strike. When,
in the name of self-help, an employer retaliates against employees for
exercising the right to strike and thus interferes with the statutory mech-
anism, courts must intervene.?
Justice Brennan seized upon the majority's conclusion that there is no
reason why those employees who chose not to gamble on the success of
the strike should suffer the consequences. Refusing to discriminate in favor
of crossovers does not place the result of a failed strike on those who did
not take the risk, but rather on those who ranked lowest in seniority-
which is precisely the point of seniority. More fundamentally, there is no
reason to favor crossovers over full-term strikers unless one is hostile
towards strikes. Rather, employers must make decisions based upon a
neutral criterion such as seniority, which is what the union requested.23
A refusal to displace junior crossovers after a strike is distinguishable
from a refusal to displace newly hired replacements. An employer's threat
to hire permanent replacements puts pressure on the strikers as a group
to abandon the strike. TWA's promise to junior crossovers produces an
additional pressure for individual workers to improve their own positions
at the expense of their co-workers. As was the employer's promise in Erie
Resistor, TWA's offer represents a divide and conquer tactic that strikes
19. Id. at 1235.
20. Unlike Justice Blackmun, Justice Brennan would hold this policy per se
illegal regardless of any business purposes an employer might assert. Id. at 1239
n.5.
21. 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
22. TWA, 109 S. Ct. at 1236.
23. When it was finally time to reinstate the full-term strikers after the
strike, it is interesting to note that TWA did so based upon seniority. Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 819 F.2d at 841.
19891
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a fundamental blow to union activity and the collective bargaining process.
Under the majority's rule, according to Justice Brennan, a six-month
employee can displace a twenty-year veteran who remained faithful to a
collective decision to strike. There may be a junior employee who does
not wish to strike and who cannot convince her co-workers to adopt her
view. The Court, however, should favor a rule that Congress provided for
and which errs on the side of solidarity and seniority over a rule allowing
discrimination based upon union activity. The principle of majority decision
is inherent in our system of exclusive bargaining representatives and may
impose burdens upon dissenters.
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent because he would uphold
only those crossover policies shown to be truly necessary to continued
operations. Justice Brennan would prohibit these policies regardless of the
employer's purposes. Justice Blackmun believed that the Court should
remand to permit TWA to make the required showing. 24 Beyond this
distinction, however, these two dissents have much in common.25
Justice Blackmun objected to the majority's suggestion that the RLA
does not contain any express limits on employer self-help. Section 2 (Fourth)
may have a precertification focus, but it does not have a precertification
"blind spot." 26 The purpose of the 1934 amendments, which included
section 2 (Fourth), was to strengthen labor. Therefore, it is reasonable to
interpret this section in the same manner as section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA,
which contains similar language.27
In response to the majority's suggestion that there was no discrimination
because there were no vacancies, Justice Blackmun reminded the Court
that merely because a particular employee occupies a job at the end of
the strike does not mean he is entitled to retain the job.28 Additionally,
the majority's analysis threatens to vitiate the majority-rule concept of
federal labor policy. The right to opt out of collective decisions when the
going gets rough is not a normal aspect of the democratic process. The
majority elevates crossovers to "free-riders" and forgets that the burdens
and benefits of collective action are borne collectively. 29 Justice Blackmun
also argued that the majority's recognition that employers and unions can
contract to displace crossovers through poststrike back-to-work agreements
undercuts the importance of a dissident's right to be free from the economic
24. TWA, 109 S. Ct. at 1240.
25. Justice Brennan joined Justice Blackmun as to Parts I and I.
26. TWA, 109 S. Ct. at 1241.
27. National Labor Relations Act, section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1982), "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... (3) by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
28. TWA, 109 S. Ct. at 1243.
29. Id. at 1244.
[Vol. 54
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consequences of strikes.30 Justice Blackmun concluded by explaining why
these cases should be reviewed on a case-to-case basis and why employers
should be required to prove business necessity.3"
DIsCUSSION
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion does not provide an acceptable
result. It offends common sense to suggest that TWA's promise to junior
crossovers is no more divisive than offers to new permanent hires. The
basic concept of a discrete group taking on outside forces is shattered
when employers are permitted to make these offers to junior crossovers.
Not only can junior strikers now reclaim their old jobs, they can actually
improve their assignments by assuming their fellow strikers' positions.
So long as outside applicants fill positions, employees can hold on to
tenuous notions of "us against them" and "we are in this together."
Suddenly, however, the probability of an employee improving his own
assignment is directly proportional to the speed with which he abandons
the joint effort. The fact that co-workers have abandoned a collectively
approved strike now confronts those who continue striking. The crossovers
they once worked alongside and depended upon for support and collective
action now have taken their jobs. It is one thing to recognize that outsiders
may not support your cause; it is another to realize that it has become
even harder to depend upon insiders. This realization significantly impairs
any willingness to attempt future collective action. One should not pretend
the effect of this policy is not long term. So long as one worker keeps
a position previously held by a second worker, a sense of unfair denial
will continue to simmer, if not burn.
Permitting an employer to hire new permanent employees during an
economic strike does not compel the conclusion reached by the Supreme
Court in TWA. A practice of hiring employees to replace strikers still
respects the principle that a labor relations system structured around col-
lective bargaining requires two distinct participants, labor and management.
By hiring new employees, an employer reminds strikers that they are not
quite as powerful as they thought they were. By allowing employers to
hire new permanent employees, the Court is providing employers with
another weapon within the framework of the power struggle. The result
in TWA, however, allows employers to disregard the structure of the
collective bargaining process and make offers to employees that can destroy
collective activity from within.
When an approximate balance of power exists between management
and labor, employees have the strength to effectively negotiate issues of
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1247.
1989] 949
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compensation and working conditions. Collective bargaining, however, per-
forms another important role that courts must not overlook. It provides
the means through which employees can have a real voice regarding the
direction of the enterprise. The TWA decision decreases the likelihood of
a successful strike. Declining union strength and a reduced incentive to
engage in collective activity diminish the opportunity to participate in the
enterprise, which is a function of the relative strength of the union.
There are several issues that the Supreme Court does not adequately
explore. Junior crossovers do not require as much incentive to return to
work as new hires need to accept a new job.32 Junior crossovers have
already made an investment with this employer. They have selected a
convenient residence and have begun to accumulate seniority. New hires
make unique sacrifices that may justify protection from displacement. Giving
up their current jobs may be one such sacrifice.
One must also ask whether this result best provides for safe public
transportation. Initially, it may appear that safety can be ensured by
encouraging junior employees to return to work so the employer will not
have to rely upon completely inexperienced new hires. Yet one must question
the long term effect of such a policy. To continue operations, TWA hired
2,350 new flight attendants and 1,280 employees who either did not strike
or returned to work before the end of the strike. After 72 days, the union
made an unconditional offer to return to work on behalf of 5,000 full-
term strikers. TWA, however, initially recalled only 197 of the most senior
full-term strikers. Thus, immediately after the strike, approximately 5% of
the work force consisted of full-term striking employees. Even two years
later, TWA had rehired only 1,100 full-term strikers.33 Given the attrac-
tiveness of the employer's guarantee against displacement, one can expect
that many crossovers were the least senior and least experienced employees.
Thus, it is probable that while this policy allows an employer to quickly
attain the necessary minimum of workers and, thereby, more frequently
and more effectively avoid agreeing to strikers' demands, employers will
also consequently end up more frequently with a less experienced work
force.
The particular facts in this case may have made it easier for the
Supreme Court to reach its conclusion. Petitioner's Reply Brief suggested
32. Compare the district court opinion which stated: "It is surely as difficult
psychologically for old employees to abandon their coworkers and cross a picket
line as it is for new hires to take such action. If MacKay Radio is sound ... the
same principles would seem to apply to protect crossovers." Independent Fed'n of
Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 470, 474 (W.D.
Mo. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 819 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S.
Ct. 1225 (1989).
33. TWA, 109 S. Ct. at 1229.
[Vol. 54
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that junior crossovers did not rush to the most desirable jobs.3 4 The Brief
asserted that so few flight attendants bid for the "more desired" service
manager positions that TWA had to "draft" the least senior attendants
to fill those jobs5.3 Additionally, only about 17% of the early returning
strikers were in California,3 6 presumably one of the more sought-after
domiciles. Although TWA limited its argument to the position of service
manager, the scenario of crossovers grabbing the most desirable assignments
may not have developed.
Furthermore, employment as a flight attendant is obviously quite dif-
ferent from employment in maintenance or repair. When a full-term striker
who is a mechanic returns to a job site where a crossover has assumed
her earlier position, she will not be far from her old job. This physical
closeness on a daily basis will produce tension and possible disruption
between employees. Conversely, with shifting small crews of flight atten-
dants, it is difficult to pinpoint who has "your" job so tensions and
disruptions are less likely to occur. The deficiencies of this crossover policy
may become much more apparent when the strike involves different workers.
CONCLUSION
The 'majority opinion underestimates the divisiveness of a crossover
policy and rejects the suggestion that permanent new hires require different
incentives 'than junior crossovers. The opinion does not develop long term
safety concerns or examine the implication of crossover policies for other
types of work. The most objectionable aspect of this decision, however,
is that it refuses to recognize the tenuous character of collective action in
this country.
Striking junior employees may believe that accepting an employer's
offer to return to work, with the assurance that senior employees will not
replace junior employees when the strike is over, is truly in his or her
best interest. This perception is dangerously short-sighted. Under our present
system of labor relations, we cast labor and management as distinct entities
with sometimes conflicting interests to pursue, rather than as an integrated,
equally participating single unit. If employees are to acquire broad, across-
the-board improvements in wages and working conditions, they will need
34. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.7, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989).
35. Id. One may question, however, the alleged desirability of a position
for which nobody applied.
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the strength of an organized collective voice. 7 In fact, just the ever-present
threat of forming a union pushes employers into adopting favorable working
conditions. It is naive to suggest employers will voluntarily absorb the cost
of a favorable work environment when there is no longer genuine potential
for effective, concerted action. Even when it is difficult to achieve goals
by dealing directly with particular employers, collective action may be
effective in encouraging legislative action.
The viability of our labor relations system assumes a balance of power
between employee collective action and management authority. Without
such a balance, the system will not only fail to provide sufficient protection
to employees, it will also fail to provide for industrial peace through
permanent conference and negotiation. Furthermore, the only way employees
can have significant input into the operation and direction of an enterprise
is through collective bargaining. When an employer is allowed to undercut
collective bargaining by pandering to individual self-interest, future collective
attempts become much less probable and the vehicle for participation in
one's own workplace quietly slips away. The majority in TWA is deeply
concerned that prohibiting TWA's offer will unjustly penalize individual
strikers. Yet the Court ignores what all employees, including junior strikers,
lose when the Court impairs the potential for collective action.
TWA's offer to junior crossovers represents a fundamental attack on
union activity and the collective bargaining process which requires judicial
intervention. In a global economy, our notions of balancing power may
have become antiquated. It may be time to move to a more ownership
integrated, worker participatory model of labor-management relations. Be-
fore courts undermine the existing structure, however, the substitute struc-
ture must be in place.
37. A similar argument was made in Respondent's Brief:
Labor unions ... were organized out of the necessities of the situation.
A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself
and family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought
fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary
and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert influence upon
him and to leave him in a body in order by this inconvenience to induce
him to make better terms with them.
Brief for Respondent at 19, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of
Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989) (quoting American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)).
952 [Vol. 54
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